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A LEAGUE OF INSINCERITY

BY DAVID JAYNE HILL

CONSIDERED vaguely and abstractly, the expression a "League of Nations" seems not only innocent but promising of great and desirable results. The prejudice thus created in its favor, coupled with possibilities, predictions, and promises regarding the suppression of war and the permanent establishment of peace, has won for those who have proposed, and are now urging the nation to accept, the Covenant of the League of Nations elaborated at Paris a widespread, an earnest, and without doubt a sincerely conscientious following of adherents.

That the enthusiasts of this persuasion should resent opposition to this proposal is not unnatural. To them it is like assailing virtue or denying the precepts of religion. Unable to perceive any other excuse for opposition, they set down even the moderate critics of so holy an enterprise as either blind bigots, narrow chauvinists, or selfish partisans.

If the faith of these advocates of a League of Nations were well grounded, if the plans proposed were likely to be really effective, if peace were the one great and only object to be attained, and above all if the nations entering into the compact were in fact sincere to a point of self-forgetfulness, as it is desired and expected that the American people will be, an honest man and a true patriot would not only hesitate to oppose such a league but he would feel that his conscience compelled him to approve and support it.

Quite unexpectedly the curtain has been partly lifted upon the scene of the Conference at Paris, and some of its secret aims and motives have been disclosed. Whatever may be said of the official world, the rank and file of the school of thought created by the League to Enforce Peace,

the World's Court League, and the other organized peace movements in the United States are coming to understand, by the revelation of facts which their faith prevented them from anticipating, that the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Peace so indissolubly connected with it are not the purely ideal constructions which they have been supposed to be; but, on the contrary, involve on the one hand a practical repudiation of the principles by which they were imagined to be controlled, and on the other a failure to embody, or even to consider, the ideals of international organization which for the last quarter of a century have animated the hopes and inspired the activities of the best thought on international questions in the United States. The shock of surprise and disillusionment which these excellent and honorable citizens feel, as these disclosures are made, will enable them to understand why some independent critics long associated with the cause they hold dear have not hesitated from the beginning to seek more light upon this compact. And when they remember the part which some of these same critics have in the past played in teaching the doctrine of an internationalism based on law, and not on force, they may even pardon what seemed to them a defection which at first they could not comprehend.

It is a fact not without significance that American statesmen personally familiar through their own experience with the aims and methods of European diplomacy, have almost without exception, where no other reason than strictly unprejudiced judgment has existed, regarded with skepticism the effort to combine with a peace necessarily punitive a plan for the political reorganization of the world. They have realized not only that a tree may be known by its fruits, but that the kind of fruit to be expected may be known from the nature of the tree. As Americans, they have clearly understood that, from the conditions of the case, and without any reflection upon the integrity of European statesmen, Europe possesses "a set of primary interests" with which—as Washington said long ago, and until recently every American statesman of the first rank has believed—we, as a constitutional republic, possessing neither dynastic nor colonial interests nor imperial traditions of statecraft, have no relation. That these interests would be abandoned in the Conference at Paris it was

impossible to believe; for every one of the Great Powers with which we have been associated, notwithstanding the growth of democracy among the people in most of them, is either an actual empire, ruling subject-races and exploiting distant continents for gain, or is an aspirant to imperial dominion. All of them are eager to write a policy of mutual insurance. Not one of them is ready to give up any territory or any advantage it now possesses, no matter where it is held or at whose disadvantage.

How unequally we would be yoked with these Powers in any unlimited alliance is evident to all who reflect upon it. This does not forbid that we should place ourselves on an equality with all of them in the advocacy, the further improvement, and the defense of International Law. We may rightly refuse to deal with any nation that violates it until it has made reparation and acknowledges its authority. We should, undoubtedly, bring all our available forces to bear against any nation that criminally breaks its legal engagements; and we may properly lend such aid as we are at the time reasonably able to lend to a nation that is the victim of criminal aggression; but to become the guarantor of possessions the acquisition of which was iniquitous, or of the consummation of future transactions of which we may not even be aware, is not only wholly outside our national obligations, but violative of the only principles upon which international peace and harmony can ever be permanently organized. Unless our ideals are respected, our force and our resources might prove more helpful to the true interests of mankind if left entirely under our own control, with no prospect of future stultification through exposure to the charge of being faithless to obligations which we ought never to have assumed.

It is with extreme reluctance that I would even seem to bring under criticism any of our co-belligerents in the Great War. Months ago I pointed out the danger that a too intimate interference in matters foreign to us might lead to animadversions which would tend to alienate rather than to solidify the members of the Entente. Unhappily, that alienation has already in part resulted from a too close relation to one another's private affairs. So far as the defeat of the Central Powers was concerned, all the members of the Entente fought together in a holy companionship. In this there was complete unanimity of aim and interest. It

was a precious achievement, this sense of complete community in action. It has unfortunately been to a great degree sacrificed by an attempt to regulate matters in which that community of purpose had no place.

There was obviously, through all the entanglements of the Peace Conference, one high and universal aim to which the united efforts of the members might have been directed; while the adjustment of separate national interests could have been left to those to whom they specifically pertained, in accordance with definite rules previously agreed upon. In truth, the decisions and arrangements of the Supreme Council—which ranged at different times from ten to three members, according to circumstances—were invariably based on conceptions of power, and virtually never on accepted principles. And yet there remained, during all the negotiations, a community of interest transcending every other, which, nevertheless, was totally ignored. That interest, which was common to all, was that, henceforth, the world should be governed by definite principles of justice, and not controlled by private diplomatic bargains. If this is so, the supreme effort of the future should not merely be to safeguard possessions, irrespective of the manner in which they were acquired or are administered, but to secure the inherent rights of States, both small and great, under the rulings of a common law.

For this the Conference at Paris has shown no inclination. As I have elsewhere indicated, there is in the Covenant of the League of Nations no declaration of the inherent rights of peoples, no assertion or admission that small or weak States have any rights whatever, except such as this League pleases to accord to them. As to definite and authoritative law, under which rights can be claimed and defended in a judicial manner, there is not only no provision for it in the Covenant, but a proposal to embody it coming from outside the Conference and endorsed by the best legal thought in this country was rejected. This was a disappointment in which, I think, all lovers of justice who appreciate its significance must share.

I do not affirm that in any of their transactions the members of the Peace Conference at Paris have been insincere. According to accepted standards of sincerity as understood in traditional diplomacy, they have not been insincere. But those standards are not our standards. They

are not the standards in which we believe, and which many felt they had reason to expect would be observed. We were looking for "open covenants, openly arrived at," and we have in our hands secret agreements secretly arrived at, some of which we as a nation are now called upon to sanction and even to guarantee.

When, therefore, I speak of "insincerity," I am reading no lecture in morality to foreign Powers. I am merely stating the admitted facts with regard to what those Powers have done and may intend to do, not assuming any supervision over their performance or making any accusations of deliberate deception. The insincerity I wish at this time to emphasize is that which we, the American people, would manifest, if we should pretend, in the face of our knowledge, that this Covenant and the treaty of which it forms a part are a realization of our American international ideals.

It will, no doubt, be said that this Covenant is the nearest approach to a realization of our hopes which it is practically possible to obtain. Is any defender of this Covenant sure of that? Is our support of what has been proposed in this Covenant so unimportant to the rest of the world that our most earnest aims as a people and our most sacred sense of national responsibility may be treated with indifference? But a short time ago we were instructed otherwise. Our adherence to this Covenant was represented as something upon which the welfare of the whole world absolutely depends, and without which there will be universal chaos. Is this true, or is it false? If it is true, is it conceivable that our efforts to modify this compact in such a manner as to conform to our national traditions can be condemned either by the American protagonists of the Covenant or by European statesmen? If, on the contrary, it is false, then let us make an end of empty illusions about it, and sensibly consider, as other nations do, where our interests lie.

We have at present before us a considerable body of evidence that it is not principles, but interests, that are to be protected by the Covenant of the League of Nations. We know what some at least of the past transactions have been. What has happened to change the intentions of those who entered into those compacts? We have seen brought to the light the secret compacts of France and Great Britain with Russia, with Italy, and with Japan; these last made

as late as February and March 1, 1917, at the very moment when China, whose interests were concerned, was being urged to declare herself an ally and a belligerent, not in her own interest, but for the benefit of those who, without her knowledge, were bargaining away among themselves her undoubted rights and her future safety. Not only this, but these agreements were made at a time when the probability of our participation in the war was one of the reasons why the Chinese Republic, relying upon our friendship, as well as our influence and example, was disposed to enter it; yet both China and ourselves were left in complete ignorance of these secret "understandings" against the interest of a nation whose "territorial entity" it was one of the greatest triumphs of American diplomacy to have defended against the aggressions of European Powers.

We had all been aware that secret "understandings" were customary in the past, but we were expecting that they were to be abandoned. It was believed that not one of them would be allowed to outlive the formation of the League of Nations, now embodied in a treaty which sanctions at least one of these secret compacts, in the provisions of Section VIII of Part IV of the Treaty of Peace, under the title "Shantung." Here was an opportunity for the Conference to rectify a wrong and repudiate a dangerous policy, but the wrong was neither righted nor the policy repudiated. On the contrary, the wrong secretly agreed to was specifically sanctioned in this Treaty of Peace, and the defenders of that document are placed in the position of having to say that the treatment of China in this matter is not unjust, because in her weakness she could not have prevented it; that the concessions enforced upon her are not really territorial but only economic; and, finally, that the imposition is but temporary. This defense of a wrong decision amounts to saying that the Chinese Republic is not to be treated as a strong Power would expect to be; that encroachments upon economic resources have no vital connection with territorial and political rights; and that a condition is temporary to which no definite limit of time is set, and to which no limit is even suggested in the document imposing the obligation of submission. No one of the Powers imposing this servitude, however it be explained, would for a moment entertain the thought of itself submitting to it.

The representatives of China declare that the concessions assigned to Japan by the Treaty constitute a danger not only to the economic but to the political control of the entire Republic; and, although it is not necessary to establish the truth of this in order to justify China's protest, that opinion is held by all who have seriously examined the question. That these concessions were extorted by force from Germany gives no title to them which Germany did not possess, and her only title, as we know, was forceful occupation. China has expressed a wish to recover her rightful possessions by reimbursing the conqueror for the cost of driving out the Germans, but this offer has not been accepted. The reason for it is obvious. The question is not merely an economic one.

If the project of imperial expansion is henceforth to be abandoned, the opportunity of Japan to win the confidence and approval of the rest of the world is great. The acceptance of China's protest, which was not even heard by the Conference, would have been a telling contribution to the new order of international relationship. But it would be unjust to place too much blame upon Japan. What evidence had been given by the Powers assembled at Paris that they, in like circumstances, would act otherwise than in the manner Japan was acting? Having learned the game of European diplomacy, why should the Japanese abandon it, so long as the rules remained unchanged? Who had proposed any change in the rules? Who had proposed any declaration of rights? Who had declared that, juristically, the rights of a weak State were equal to those of a strong State, and would receive the same protection? Who had set up any principle whatever as a rule and standard of conduct? The Japanese attitude, therefore, is not to be too severely censured. Least of all should it be considered an offense to us. When the transfer to Japan of the German extortions was under consideration, although a majority of the American Commission is reported to have realized and opposed the injustice of it to China, the Commission nevertheless decided to sustain it. Thus the representatives of a Republic whose potential strength, if fully organized, could wipe half of Asia off the map, went out of the Conference "with their heads upon their breasts"—to employ the expression which the President applied in his Boston speech to all Europe, in case we did not do our duty.

Why was this injustice permitted? There is but one answer: China is not a military Power, but a peaceful nation, unable to defend its rights by force; while Japan is a strong and militant Power whose adhesion is necessary to the strength of the League of Nations. Her will must, therefore, be accepted; otherwise the League of Nations, it was believed, could not be formed. This, then, is a part of the price at which this League is bought. But this is not the whole price. The principle of equity and the right of a nation to self-determination were thereby abandoned. In brief, it was a choice between Justice and the League.

Nobody in Europe, outside of Government circles, approves of this failure of the Conference to rise above the conceptions of the old diplomacy. "Among Frenchmen and British with whom I talked at Paris," says a highly capable observer, "there was no pretense that the treatment accorded to China represented the sentiment of the French and British peoples. Political expediency dictated the attitudes of the French and British Governments"; and, it must be added, of our own also.

There is no sign that the ethical standards of the old diplomacy have been changed. The Japanese face their colleagues with perfect equanimity. "They argued," continues the same observer, speaking of his conversations with them, "that while several of the other Powers in the Allied group are still retaining special leases and concessions in China obtained and held against China's wishes, Japan cannot be asked to forego the positions she has obtained."

The only answer to this argument is a complete change of base. The Covenant of the League of Nations does not adopt it. It even seems to evade the proposal of change. It requires nothing to be given up, no matter how it was obtained. It makes no provision by which any of these economic aggressions on weak Powers may be ended. While we in America are thinking of the League of Nations as a remedy for wrongs, the imperial Powers are interested in sequestering the spoils of war. The League, it is said, is to enforce peace; but it is not to the League, it is to "the principal Allied and Associated Powers" that all the concessions wrung from Germany by the Treaty of Peace are committed.

Perhaps, on the whole, the best defense of the Shantung

article in the Treaty of Peace is the fact that it is based on certain "understandings" which the Powers entering into them felt they could not disavow. It is, therefore, timely for us to inquire what still unexecuted "understandings" of a like character may still exist, and what may be the relation of the United States to them in case the Covenant of the League of Nations is ratified.

We know that the parts of Africa and the Pacific Islands for which mandates are to be issued by the League of Nations are already the subject of "understandings." The Dark Continent is almost entirely divided between Great Britain and France, with some concessions to Italy, in the expectation that Spain and Portugal will eventually dispose of their holdings on that continent—of course in a market where the bidding will be controlled by agreement.

The fate of the Ottoman Empire is still in question, but many private engagements are known to exist concerning it. For example, a writer on "The Future of Turkey," in *The Contemporary Review* for June, 1919, speaks with confidence of what the distribution is to be. "So far as Armenia is concerned," he says, "the first necessity is to endeavor to reconcile the claims put forward on her behalf with those based by France upon the agreement with England and Russia, made in the Spring of 1916. Whilst public opinion seems to be divided upon the present validity of that agreement, it is obvious that France should be the mandatory Power for Syria." He then goes on to argue what Armenia should include, and thinks it of "immense importance"; for "if America is to be persuaded to undertake this responsibility, Armenia must include, not merely just such area as Europe might consider a disencumbrance, but, in fact, practically so much or so little as the Government of Washington might believe to be necessary to make its work a success."

Will the moral enthusiasts who are defending the Covenant as an almost divine ordinance dwell long enough on this quotation to comprehend and weigh its implications? The claims put forth in behalf of Armenia are to be "reconciled" with those of France based on an agreement made with England and Russia, in 1916, for the possession of parts of Armenia! That country, it would seem, is to be delimited, not as the Armenians occupying the land desire,

but with reference to the claims of France to this territory based on past agreements with England. As nothing could be done by the League of Nations without the consent of every member of the Council, the Great Powers, parties to the "understanding," would undoubtedly sustain it. If the United States should feel disposed to offer objection, it would be confronted, as in the case of Shantung, with a choice between submission and the dissolution of the League, and its decision would no doubt be based on the precedent itself had set.

But unless America is prepared to repudiate the whole scheme of "mandates," it will be necessary to become an accomplice in the "understandings" of the imperial Powers to a still greater extent than this. If America, the writer quoted informs us, should not be content to accept a mandate for an area left over after the other Powers had taken what they wanted—that is, such a "disencumbrance" as Armenia might be to them—a new "understanding" would have to be arranged in order to round out this "disencumbrance," and the Government at Washington, not the inhabitants of the region, would then determine how much or how little of Armenia should be given to France!

Where in this partition of territory do the rights of the Armenians themselves appear? What of "self-determination" in general? "Whilst the little Republic of Ararat, composed of the districts of Erivan, Kars and Bantum," continues this writer, "is reported to have elected to become, and therefore should become, a part of the New Armenia, it seems to me that, in the above mentioned circumstances, it would be for America to decide how much of the six valayets should be incorporated."

But there is no end of these "understandings" in which the people disposed of have nothing to say. "As no serious division of opinion seems to exist to the effect that Mesopotamia, Arabia, and Palestine . . . are to have a British mandate," the writer continues, "we can pass at once to a discussion of the futures of the areas which remain," and he then goes on to state what disposition is to be made of the rest of the Ottoman Empire. "To fulfil the principle of nationalities, Greece," he says, "should certainly secure possession of the Aegean Islands held by Italy under the Treaty of Lausanne"; but here rises another ghost of murdered nationality: "these islands were, however, definitely

given to the latter country by the pact of London"! With regard to the Adalia region, as there is no basis in nationality, the claim of Italy "depends upon certain rights and interests largely self-assumed and self-imposed—a claim unfortunately recognized by England, France, and Russia at the time of Italy's entry into the war."

Very soon, it appears, if this Covenant is ratified, we shall find ourselves not only confronted by these "understandings" but actually involved in them, and even obliged to aid in executing them, or enter into new "understandings" with regard to what does not concern us.

The question is thus pressed upon us: What are the provisions of the Covenant regarding these "understandings"? Article XXI reads: "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace."

These words are not to be found in the original draft of the Covenant. They were introduced with the ostensible purpose of recognizing the Monroe Doctrine; but the form of expression employed implies that, *besides* the Monroe Doctrine, there are certain engagements, such as treaties of arbitration and "regional understandings," of which last the American policy is assumed to be only an example, the validity of which is not affected by this Covenant. So far as the Monroe Doctrine itself is concerned, the expression "regional understandings" might have been omitted. The sentence would then simply read: "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of the Monroe Doctrine."

It has been generally felt in the United States, where the Monroe Doctrine is not regarded as an "engagement" or an "understanding," but simply and solely as a national policy, that the expression "regional understandings" does not properly describe this policy. Why, then, was this expression chosen? No form of expression could better cover the agreements regarding Shantung, the partition of the Ottoman Empire, and the distribution of the Pacific Islands taken from Germany. These are, of course, not "like" the Monroe Doctrine, in the sense of having a similar purpose; but all are "regional," that is, geographically limited, and they are "understandings." In substance they

are not only different from, but are opposed to, the Monroe Doctrine; for the American policy regards the "self-determination" of the inhabitants of the Western Hemisphere as a matter of interest to the United States; while these "understandings" are intended to cover the agreements of foreign Powers among themselves to divide, and occupy, and exploit distant territories, regardless of the will of the inhabitants.

The only intelligible reason for classing the Monroe Doctrine as a "regional understanding" is the assumption that it *becomes* an understanding through the agreement entered into with the signatories of this Covenant. There must, however, be a purpose in using the general expression "regional understandings"; which is plainly intended to include an entire class of agreements, all of which are recognized as being of equal validity and lying beyond the scope of this Covenant.

It is, therefore, desirable to know precisely *what* "regional understandings," *other* than the Monroe Doctrine, are here included, and at the same time who originated this new and undefined expression which might so obviously be applied to the "understandings" of a private and even secret nature to which attention has been called.

It is, of course, not overlooked that, in Article XVIII, it is provided that "Every convention or international engagement entered into henceforth by any member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat"; and, in Article XX, it is agreed that "this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and the members solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof."

At first sight these provisions seem to render nugatory all secret "understandings" between the members of the League. It is to be noted, however, that no obligation is accepted to abrogate any "understanding" unless it is "*inconsistent with the terms of the Covenant*"; but, in Article XXI, it is declared that "*Nothing* in this Covenant shall be deemed to *affect the validity* of" the class of international engagements therein named, "such as arbitration treaties and regional understandings." This provision, therefore, it might be contended, excludes such "under-

standings" from registration, abrogation, and prohibition in the future. It is, in effect, a ratification of *all* "regional understandings." It might even be held that, since their validity is expressly declared not to be affected by anything in the Covenant, it exempts them from arbitration, unless perhaps with reference to a dispute about one of the terms of the understanding. It has not, I believe, been pretended that China, for example, could through the League of Nations compel Japan to arbitrate her claims in Shantung. There would be at least three Powers in the Council which would deny the appeal, and it is difficult to believe that the Government of the United States, having refused even to hear China's protest, would support the demand for arbitration.

It may be said that Article X is an adequate protection of international rights, because it pledges the members of the League "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity" of all members of the League. We see, however, how utterly ineffective this provision is in the case of a weak Power. In May, 1915, Japan presented her famous "Twenty-one Demands." They included the substitution of Japan for Germany in that province, the political and economic domination of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Japanese control of a most important iron and coal enterprise in Central China, and an engagement of China not to cede or lease to any other Power any part of the coast of China. To these demands China was compelled to submit in conventions negotiated and concluded under circumstances of intimidation and duress, regardless of the sovereign will of the Republic. Other demands were made and postponed, but not withdrawn.

At the Peace Conference China prayed for the abrogation of the notes of May, 1915, on the ground that they were violative of "the territorial integrity and political independence of China," and contradictory of what have been announced as the guiding principles of the Peace Conference. As a distinguished Chinese statesman has put the case, "They constitute an injustice which, if not righted, will cause so much unrest and unsettlement in Far-Eastern politics as will, in time, assume proportions which will have a reflex action in Europe and America."

It is now understood, and I believe officially admitted,

that a failure to support the demands made by Japan upon China would have rendered doubtful the adherence of certain Powers to the League, and perhaps would have created an indisposition to form any League at all. If that is the price at which the formation of this League was bought, it is not difficult to foresee what its future will be; for, as a Chinese delegate asked, in commenting on a semi-official communication upon the attitude of the President of the United States in this matter: "What reason is there to assume that a League of Nations, whose Covenant is created in conjunction with this Treaty of Peace, can be depended on to rectify or to reverse the provisions of that treaty?" He might have added, particularly in view of the fact that the Covenant itself expressly provides for the exemption of "regional understandings," like the Shantung compacts, from the obligations of the Covenant, by affirming this exemption in that document itself!

In this connection it would be of interest to know precisely to what "regional understanding" we shall be committing ourselves if we accept unchanged Article XXI of this Covenant. And here it is important to note that, until they go into execution, these understandings will probably remain secret, since there is nothing in the Covenant to prohibit this; for they are not formal treaties and conventions: they are promises contained in conversations and notes exchanged in the course of diplomatic correspondence, and, if they are soon to be executed, may not even be reduced to writing. They seem, therefore, to permit of unlimited secret bargaining.

As events develop, this reservation of the validity of "regional understandings" in Article XXI may be found to have a close connection with intended "mandates" over all so-called "backward countries." Theoretically, the League of Nations is to issue "Acts and Charters" for the administration of these countries; but practically they will be portioned out to the "Big Five" in accordance with "understandings" already agreed upon. A highly competent publicist, who was in Paris during the Peace Conference and in close touch with important sources of information, reports as a matter of general knowledge, that a private agreement was reached in a personal conference of delegates last March, in Paris, to the effect that the British, French and Japanese Governments would support one

another in all questions relating to Asia and would jointly approve of Japan's claims in Shantung, as in fact they had already agreed to do. This "understanding" regarding "*all Asia*," he reports, was reached between the completion of the first draft of the Covenant and the revision of it, which resulted in the addition of Article XXI regarding "regional understandings."

With Russia disintegrated, the Ottoman Empire dismembered and apportioned to European Powers, and China left without independence, it is noteworthy that the whole of Asia becomes a field for unimpeded foreign exploitation. India, Siam, and Hedjaz are voting States in the Assembly of the League, but all of them are already under the control of Great Britain alone or jointly with France. Persia is the only other Asiatic State invited to become an adherent of the League, and since the collapse of Russia, the British "sphere of interest" in Persia has become unlimited. Italy is demanding compensation in Asia, and when it is granted, four of the five permanent members of the Council will have a community of interest in the "regional understandings" such as Article XXI renders valid and exempts from all the obligations of the Covenant.

But this is not the whole import of Article XXI. If, appealing to the protection of Article X, any country likely to be subjected to these "understandings" should seek, as China has done, to protect itself against encroachment, any one of the aggressors, under the rule of unanimity in the Council, could object that intervention was unwarranted, and if any other member of the League, actuated by sympathy or even by an adverse interest, should then go to war to prevent the aggression, that nation would find itself violating the Covenant, and thereby at war with the League.

Before adopting this Covenant, the reason for the reference in it to "regional understandings" should be fully explained; and, above all, this article should not be allowed to take its place there under the cover of the Monroe Doctrine, which is designed to protect the self-determination of free nations, and has been coupled with the Golden Rule as summing up the foreign policy of the United States.

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